feat(Dependencies): Update dependency aiohttp to v3.10.2 [SECURITY]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
aiohttp	3.9.4 -> 3.10.2

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-37276

Impact

aiohttp v3.8.4 and earlier are bundled with llhttp v6.0.6 which is vulnerable to CVE-2023-30589. The vulnerable code is used by aiohttp for its HTTP request parser when available which is the default case when installing from a wheel.

This vulnerability only affects users of aiohttp as an HTTP server (ie aiohttp.Application), you are not affected by this vulnerability if you are using aiohttp as an HTTP client library (ie aiohttp.ClientSession).

Reproducer

from aiohttp import web

async def example(request: web.Request):
    headers = dict(request.headers)
    body = await request.content.read()
    return web.Response(text=f"headers: {headers} body: {body}")

app = web.Application()
app.add_routes([web.post('/', example)])
web.run_app(app)

Sending a crafted HTTP request will cause the server to misinterpret one of the HTTP header values leading to HTTP request smuggling.

$ printf "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost:8080\r\nX-Abc: \rxTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n1\r\nA\r\n0\r\n\r\n" \
  | nc localhost 8080

Expected output:
  headers: {'Host': 'localhost:8080', 'X-Abc': '\rxTransfer-Encoding: chunked'} body: b''

Actual output (note that 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked' is an HTTP header now and body is treated differently)
  headers: {'Host': 'localhost:8080', 'X-Abc': '', 'Transfer-Encoding': 'chunked'} body: b'A'

Patches

Upgrade to the latest version of aiohttp to resolve this vulnerability. It has been fixed in v3.8.5: pip install aiohttp >= 3.8.5

Workarounds

If you aren't able to upgrade you can reinstall aiohttp using AIOHTTP_NO_EXTENSIONS=1 as an environment variable to disable the llhttp HTTP request parser implementation. The pure Python implementation isn't vulnerable to request smuggling:

$ python -m pip uninstall --yes aiohttp
$ AIOHTTP_NO_EXTENSIONS=1 python -m pip install --no-binary=aiohttp --no-cache aiohttp

References

• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30589
• https://hackerone.com/reports/2001873

CVE-2023-47627

Summary

The HTTP parser in AIOHTTP has numerous problems with header parsing, which could lead to request smuggling.
This parser is only used when AIOHTTP_NO_EXTENSIONS is enabled (or not using a prebuilt wheel).

Details

Bug 1: Bad parsing of Content-Length values

Description

RFC 9110 says this:

Content-Length = 1*DIGIT

AIOHTTP does not enforce this rule, presumably because of an incorrect usage of the builtin int constructor. Because the int constructor accepts + and - prefixes, and digit-separating underscores, using int to parse CL values leads AIOHTTP to significant misinterpretation.

Examples

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Content-Length: -0\r\n
\r\n
X

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Content-Length: +0_1\r\n
\r\n
X

Suggested action

Verify that a Content-Length value consists only of ASCII digits before parsing, as the standard requires.

Bug 2: Improper handling of NUL, CR, and LF in header values

Description

RFC 9110 says this:

Field values containing CR, LF, or NUL characters are invalid and dangerous, due to the varying ways that implementations might parse and interpret those characters; a recipient of CR, LF, or NUL within a field value MUST either reject the message or replace each of those characters with SP before further processing or forwarding of that message.

AIOHTTP's HTTP parser does not enforce this rule, and will happily process header values containing these three forbidden characters without replacing them with SP.

Examples

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Header: v\x00alue\r\n
\r\n

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Header: v\ralue\r\n
\r\n

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Header: v\nalue\r\n
\r\n

Suggested action

Reject all messages with NUL, CR, or LF in a header value. The translation to space thing, while technically allowed, does not seem like a good idea to me.

Bug 3: Improper stripping of whitespace before colon in HTTP headers

Description

RFC 9112 says this:

No whitespace is allowed between the field name and colon. In the past, differences in the handling of such whitespace have led to security vulnerabilities in request routing and response handling. A server MUST reject, with a response status code of 400 (Bad Request), any received request message that contains whitespace between a header field name and colon.

AIOHTTP does not enforce this rule, and will simply strip any whitespace before the colon in an HTTP header.

Example

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Content-Length : 1\r\n
\r\n
X

Suggested action

Reject all messages with whitespace before a colon in a header field, as the standard requires.

PoC

Example requests are embedded in the previous section. To reproduce these bugs, start an AIOHTTP server without llhttp (i.e. AIOHTTP_NO_EXTENSIONS=1) and send the requests given in the previous section. (e.g. by printfing into nc)

Impact

Each of these bugs can be used for request smuggling.

GHSA-pjjw-qhg8-p2p9

Summary

llhttp 8.1.1 is vulnerable to two request smuggling vulnerabilities.
Details have not been disclosed yet, so refer to llhttp for future information.
The issue is resolved by using llhttp 9+ (which is included in aiohttp 3.8.6+).

CVE-2023-49082

Summary

Improper validation makes it possible for an attacker to modify the HTTP request (e.g. insert a new header) or even create a new HTTP request if the attacker controls the HTTP method.

Details

The vulnerability occurs only if the attacker can control the HTTP method (GET, POST etc.) of the request.

Previous releases performed no validation on the provided value. If an attacker controls the HTTP method it will be used as is and can lead to HTTP request smuggling.

PoC

A minimal example can be found here:
https://gist.github.com/jnovikov/7f411ae9fe6a9a7804cf162a3bdbb44b

Impact

If the attacker can control the HTTP version of the request it will be able to modify the request (request smuggling).

Workaround

If unable to upgrade and using user-provided values for the request method, perform manual validation of the user value (e.g. by restricting it to a few known values like GET, POST etc.).

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/7806/files

CVE-2023-49081

Summary

Improper validation make it possible for an attacker to modify the HTTP request (e.g. to insert a new header) or even create a new HTTP request if the attacker controls the HTTP version.

Details

The vulnerability only occurs if the attacker can control the HTTP version of the request (including its type).
For example if an unvalidated JSON value is used as a version and the attacker is then able to pass an array as the version parameter.
Furthermore, the vulnerability only occurs when the Connection header is passed to the headers parameter.

At this point, the library will use the parsed value to create the request. If a list is passed, then it bypasses validation and it is possible to perform CRLF injection.

PoC

The POC below shows an example of providing an unvalidated array as a version:
https://gist.github.com/jnovikov/184afb593d9c2114d77f508e0ccd508e

Impact

CRLF injection leading to Request Smuggling.

Workaround

If these specific conditions are met and you are unable to upgrade, then validate the user input to the version parameter to ensure it is a str.

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/7835/files

CVE-2024-23829

Summary

Security-sensitive parts of the Python HTTP parser retained minor differences in allowable character sets, that must trigger error handling to robustly match frame boundaries of proxies in order to protect against injection of additional requests. Additionally, validation could trigger exceptions that were not handled consistently with processing of other malformed input.

Details

These problems are rooted in pattern matching protocol elements, previously improved by PR #​3235 and GHSA-gfw2-4jvh-wgfg:

1. The expression HTTP/(\d).(\d) lacked another backslash to clarify that the separator should be a literal dot, not just any Unicode code point (result: HTTP/(\d)\.(\d)).

2. The HTTP version was permitting Unicode digits, where only ASCII digits are standards-compliant.

3. Distinct regular expressions for validating HTTP Method and Header field names were used - though both should (at least) apply the common restrictions of rfc9110 token.

PoC

GET / HTTP/1ö1
GET / HTTP/1.𝟙
GET/: HTTP/1.1
Content-Encoding?: chunked

Impact

Primarily concerns running an aiohttp server without llhttp:

1. behind a proxy: Being more lenient than internet standards require could, depending on deployment environment, assist in request smuggling.
2. directly accessible or exposed behind proxies relaying malformed input: the unhandled exception could cause excessive resource consumption on the application server and/or its logging facilities.

---

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8074/files

CVE-2024-23334

Summary

Improperly configuring static resource resolution in aiohttp when used as a web server can result in the unauthorized reading of arbitrary files on the system.

Details

When using aiohttp as a web server and configuring static routes, it is necessary to specify the root path for static files. Additionally, the option 'follow_symlinks' can be used to determine whether to follow symbolic links outside the static root directory. When 'follow_symlinks' is set to True, there is no validation to check if a given file path is within the root directory.This can lead to directory traversal vulnerabilities, resulting in unauthorized access to arbitrary files on the system, even when symlinks are not present.

i.e. An application is only vulnerable with setup code like:

app.router.add_routes([
    web.static("/static", "static/", follow_symlinks=True),  # Remove follow_symlinks to avoid the vulnerability
])

Impact

This is a directory traversal vulnerability with CWE ID 22. When using aiohttp as a web server and enabling static resource resolution with follow_symlinks set to True, it can lead to this vulnerability. This vulnerability has been present since the introduction of the follow_symlinks parameter.

Workaround

Even if upgrading to a patched version of aiohttp, we recommend following these steps regardless.

If using follow_symlinks=True outside of a restricted local development environment, disable the option immediately. This option is NOT needed to follow symlinks which point to a location within the static root directory, it is only intended to allow a symlink to break out of the static directory. Even with this CVE fixed, there is still a substantial risk of misconfiguration when using this option on a server that accepts requests from remote users.

Additionally, aiohttp has always recommended using a reverse proxy server (such as nginx) to handle static resources and not to use these static resources in aiohttp for production environments. Doing so also protects against this vulnerability, and is why we expect the number of affected users to be very low.

---

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8079/files

CVE-2024-27306

Summary

A XSS vulnerability exists on index pages for static file handling.

Details

When using web.static(..., show_index=True), the resulting index pages do not escape file names.

If users can upload files with arbitrary filenames to the static directory, the server is vulnerable to XSS attacks.

Workaround

We have always recommended using a reverse proxy server (e.g. nginx) for serving static files. Users following the recommendation are unaffected.

Other users can disable show_index if unable to upgrade.

---

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8319/files

CVE-2024-30251

Summary

An attacker can send a specially crafted POST (multipart/form-data) request. When the aiohttp server processes it, the server will enter an infinite loop and be unable to process any further requests.

Impact

An attacker can stop the application from serving requests after sending a single request.

---

For anyone needing to patch older versions of aiohttp, the minimum diff needed to resolve the issue is (located in _read_chunk_from_length()):

diff --git a/aiohttp/multipart.py b/aiohttp/multipart.py
index 227be605c..71fc2654a 100644
--- a/aiohttp/multipart.py
+++ b/aiohttp/multipart.py
@​@​ -338,6 +338,8 @​@​ class BodyPartReader:
         assert self._length is not None, "Content-Length required for chunked read"
         chunk_size = min(size, self._length - self._read_bytes)
         chunk = await self._content.read(chunk_size)
+        if self._content.at_eof():
+            self._at_eof = True
         return chunk
 
     async def _read_chunk_from_stream(self, size: int) -> bytes:

This does however introduce some very minor issues with handling form data. So, if possible, it would be recommended to also backport the changes in:
aio-libs/aiohttp@cebe526
aio-libs/aiohttp@7eecdff
aio-libs/aiohttp@f21c6f2

CVE-2024-42367

Summary

Static routes which contain files with compressed variants (.gz or .br extension) were vulnerable to path traversal outside the root directory if those variants are symbolic links.

Details

The server protects static routes from path traversal outside the root directory when follow_symlinks=False (default). It does this by resolving the requested URL to an absolute path and then checking that path relative to the root. However, these checks are not performed when looking for compressed variants in the FileResponse class, and symbolic links are then automatically followed when performing Path.stat() and Path.open() to send the file.

Impact

Servers with static routes that contain compressed variants as symbolic links, pointing outside the root directory, or that permit users to upload or create such links, are impacted.

---

Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/pull/8653/files

---

Release Notes

aio-libs/aiohttp (aiohttp)

v3.10.2

Compare Source

===================

Bug fixes

• Fixed server checks for circular symbolic links to be compatible with Python 3.13 -- by :user:steverep.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8565.

• Fixed request body not being read when ignoring an Upgrade request -- by :user:Dreamsorcerer.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8597.

• Fixed an edge case where shutdown would wait for timeout when the handler was already completed -- by :user:Dreamsorcerer.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8611.

• Fixed connecting to npipe://, tcp://, and unix:// urls -- by :user:bdraco.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8632.

• Fixed WebSocket ping tasks being prematurely garbage collected -- by :user:bdraco.

  There was a small risk that WebSocket ping tasks would be prematurely garbage collected because the event loop only holds a weak reference to the task. The garbage collection risk has been fixed by holding a strong reference to the task. Additionally, the task is now scheduled eagerly with Python 3.12+ to increase the chance it can be completed immediately and avoid having to hold any references to the task.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8641.

• Fixed incorrectly following symlinks for compressed file variants -- by :user:steverep.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8652.

Removals and backward incompatible breaking changes

• Removed Request.wait_for_disconnection(), which was mistakenly added briefly in 3.10.0 -- by :user:Dreamsorcerer.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8636.

Contributor-facing changes

• Fixed monkey patches for Path.stat() and Path.is_dir() for Python 3.13 compatibility -- by :user:steverep.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8551.

Miscellaneous internal changes

• Improved WebSocket performance when messages are sent or received frequently -- by :user:bdraco.

  The WebSocket heartbeat scheduling algorithm was improved to reduce the asyncio scheduling overhead by decreasing the number of asyncio.TimerHandle creations and cancellations.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8608.

• Minor improvements to various type annotations -- by :user:Dreamsorcerer.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8634.

---

v3.10.1

Compare Source

v3.10.0

Compare Source

v3.9.5

Compare Source

==================

Bug fixes

• Fixed "Unclosed client session" when initialization of
  :py:class:~aiohttp.ClientSession fails -- by :user:NewGlad.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8253.

• Fixed regression (from :pr:8280) with adding Content-Disposition to the form-data
  part after appending to writer -- by :user:Dreamsorcerer/:user:Olegt0rr.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8332.

• Added default Content-Disposition in multipart/form-data responses to avoid broken
  form-data responses -- by :user:Dreamsorcerer.

  Related issues and pull requests on GitHub:
  :issue:8335.

---

---

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

---

• If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

---

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.